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Summary: This paper aims at assessing the fiscal sustainability and its political deter-
minants in seven Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), namely Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. First, using the 
recent sustainability approach of Bohn (1998) based on fiscal reaction function, econo-
metric findings using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) reveal a positive response of the 
primary surplus to changes in debt in several countries. In other words, fiscal policy is 
sustainable in Baltic countries, Slovenia and Slovakia, but not in Poland and in the 
Czech Republic. Second, by introducing political dummy variables, we test the electoral 
budget cycle and the partisan cycle theories. We find the presence of electoral and parti-
san cycle in Poland but not in the rest of our countries.   
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Since May 1, 2004, the EU New Member States (NMS)
1 are classified as “mem-
ber states with derogation” which means that those countries are expected to 
comply with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) limits for government budget 
deficit of 3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and government debt of 60% of 
GDP. Moreover, the fiscal situation has to be judged as sustainable in the me-
                                                 
∗ Preliminary vesion of this article is presented at the PPF Final Symposium “La consolidation du 
changement institutionnel”, in University of Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne,  October 4-5, 2007. 
∗∗ Institute of Economic Sciences, Belgrade and University of Nice Sophia-Antipolis, CEMAFI: 
sredzepagic@gmail.com (Srđan Redžepagić); Assistant-professor at the University of Burgundy, 
LEG/CEMF: matthieullorca@yahoo.fr (Matthieu Llorca) Received: 21 October 2007.  
1Malta and Cyprus also joined EU on May 1 2004 but are not considered here as we focus on 
CEEC. Srdjan Redžepagić and Matthieu Llorca 
  490 
dium term. This is a new situation for the NMS given that prior to accession 
their fiscal situation was not the subject of regular and binding surveillance.                  
            Indeed,  empirical  literature  on  public  debt  sustainability  in  transition 
countries gained in importance (see Llorca and Redzepagic, 2007
2 for a survey) 
due notably to the EU enlargement process (negotiations for EU membership in 
1999, then EU enlargement in May 2004) and to the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) perspective (Buiter, 2004). Moreover, EU process induces a slow but 
real improvement of the quality and the accessibility of the data.  
However, as Balassone and Franco (2000) rightly put it, there are serious 
difficulties in both the analytical and operational definition of sustainability. 
There is no consensus in the economic theory regarding the conditions for sus-
tainability. We must distinguish between three existing empirical approaches in 
the literature (Llorca, 2007) to assess the sustainability of fiscal policy: (i) the 
present-value method which examines the sustainability issue during broader 
periods, studying the integration and co-integration properties of the relevant 
budget variables and departing directly from the transversality condition of the 
present value budget constraint; (ii) the accounting method which investigates 
whether public finances, in a year-by-year basis, are sustainable; and (iii) the 
normative approach, developed by Blanchard et al. (1990), aiming at evaluating 
how far has fiscal policy departed from sustainability in a year-by-year basis 
through sustainability indicators 
   Thus, the most common empirical approach in the literature to test fiscal 
policy sustainability is the present-value method with influential papers such as 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991) or Quintos (1995). 
However, this part of the literature ignore that the discount factor may be corre-
lated with the primary surplus and debt. That is why, we adopt the methodology 
developed by Bohn (1995, 1998 and 2004) who proposes a convenient frame-
work to assess fiscal sustainability. He focuses on the response of the primary 
surplus to accumulated public debt that would guarantee fiscal sustainability as a 
test for sustainability.  
Most of the empirical studies estimating the reaction of the primary sur-
plus to debt levels focused on the American case and other industrial countries
3. 
However, very few papers (Neck and Getzner, [2001]; Haber and Neck [2006] 
for the case of Austria; De Haan, Sturm and de Groot [2004] for the case of the 
Netherlands; Berenger and Llorca [2007] for the case of six developed coun-
tries
4) have enriching the Bohn’s fiscal sustainability model with political vari-
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Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia by using the 
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tainable in the long term. 
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ables, whereas it is of particular interest to explore the politico-economic deter-
minants for the growth of the central government’s debt. Indeed, theoretical 
arguments taken from “political business cycle” theories (Nordhaus, 1975), such 
as the electoral and partisan cycle can explain the development of public debt. 
Moreover, such political issues are important for new EU countries facing fiscal 
challenges to join the EMU in the future.  
           As a result, the main purpose of this article is to assess first the fiscal 
sustainability in seven individual CEEC (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic) in line with the recent literature on 
fiscal reaction functions developed by Bohn. Second, we combine it with the 
investigation of the political potential determinants of fiscal sustainability in 
each country by introducing political variables such as the ideologies of political 
parties and political electoral cycles, taking the primary surplus as the variable to 
be explained. 
          The paper is organised as follows: section 2 examines the theoretical 
framework, namely the Bohn’s fiscal sustainability model and the introduction 
of political variables. Section 3 describes the sample and data, and reports the 
econometric findings. Section 4 concludes the study.  
 
 
1. Theoretical Framework 
 
Bohn (1995, 1998 and 2004) emits two important critics against the present-
value approach
5: 
Firstly, this approach has imposed some simplifying and arbitrary condi-
tions by assuming the economic environment as exogenous and constant which 
can be appropriate only under determinist circumstances and are hardly held in a 
stochastic environment. Indeed, tests of the transversality condition have com-
monly been based on the choice of the real return of debt as discount factor. 
Thus, the transversality condition would require an economic environment of 
dynamic efficiency.   
Secondly, Bohn questioned the validity of cointegration tests as they re-
quire restrictive assumptions about the stochastic process driving fiscal policy 
and ignore that the discount factor may be correlated with the debt and primary 
budget surplus. Therefore, econometric tests for stationary are not appropriate to 
provide convincing evidence for sustainability.  
As a result, in order to circumvent these drawbacks, Bohn (1998) has 
proposed a more flexible test to assess sustainability than does the present-value 
approach as it does not demand any assumptions on the real rates of interest, 
growth rates and uncertainty.  
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The strategy consists in investigating whether a government acts to in-
crease surpluses in response to increases in government debt in order to ensure 
long term government solvency. Bohn (2004) proved that such a corrective ac-
tion would satisfy the transversality condition in a stochastic setting.  
The test
6 suggests running the following regression: 
 
t t t t Z A d s ε α ρ + + + = − 0 1            (1) 
 
where st denotes the primary surplus to GDP and dt is the debt to GDP ratio re-
spectively.  
Zt is a vector which consists of variables which are assumed to affect the 
primary surplus, namely the level of temporary government spending and a 
business cycle indicator, GVAR and YVAR, respectively. Thus, the possible 
counter cyclical effect of the budget surplus is captured by the business cycle 
variable YVAR. The coefficient of YVAR is expected to be negative, as an in-
crease in the output gap is accompanied by an increase in the budget deficit. For 
the same reason, the coefficient on temporary government spending GVAR is 
also expected to be negative. 
Thus, fiscal policy can be shown to be sustainable if in equation (1), ρ is 
positive and sufficiently large, meaning that fiscal policy makers react to a high 
stock of debt at the beginning of period t by increasing the primary surplus (or 
reducing the primary deficit) in period t. This means that government acts to 
reduce the exponential growth of its debt by a factor r which is sufficient to fulfil 
the intertemporal budget constraint. 
We propose to extend the basic Bohn model for the determination of 
government fiscal policy to include political determinants of fiscal policy. 
Such political factors are related to the “political budget cycle” theories. Among 
this large literature
7, we focus on the electoral and partisan cycles on budget 
deficits.  
Thus, the theory of budget electoral cycle, developed first by Nordhaus 
(1975) and Tufte (1978) predicts that politicians, motivated by their re-election, 
take advantage of voters’ myopia (i.e fiscal illusion), so that deficits are higher 
immediately before elections than at other moments of the electoral cycle. 
Moreover, according to the theory of the partisan cycle (exposed by 
Hibbs, 1977), politicians want to be elected in order to implement their preferred 
economic policy. As a result, fiscal policies are more expansionist when the 
government is dominated by the left. Left-wing parties favour government inter-
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vention (i.e. public expenditure) and deficits; whereas right-wing (or conserva-
tive) parties favour less expenditure and a lower deficit 
Overall, the literature shows that budgetary performances are affected by 
electoral cycles but not by partisan cycles (see Berenger and Llorca, 2007 for a 
survey). 
Finally, among the empirical literature about political factors in CEEC, 
we can refer to the following studies: 
  Csontos et al. (1998) has shown, the fiscal illusion where voters are 
not aware of the costs of public services and the taxes they pay, is 
very persistent in Hungary.  
  Hallerberg and Vinhas de Souza (2000) look for evidence of oppor-
tunistic political cycles in the CEECs. They find that governments 
operating under fixed exchange rate regime pursue fiscal expansions 
during election years. Thus, they confirm that the NEW-8’s gov-
ernments acted very much like their OECD counterparts, and, where 
possible, manipulated the economy before elections. 
  Berger, Kopits, and Szekely (2004) look for any deviation in the 
CEE fiscal policies from what could be expected from the standard 
empirical factors influencing deficits and debt. They find that a po-
litical-economic bargaining position prior to EMU entry seems to tilt 
the larger CEE countries more to profligate policies, whereas the 
smaller countries are more conservative since they lack a bargaining 
position. 
  Finally, the study of Schneider and Zapal (2005) do not reveal the 
existence of statistically significant electoral cycles for 2001-2003.  
 
 
2.1 Empirical Investigation 
 
2.1 Sample and Data 
 
Appendix A describes the sources, the definitions of the data. The political de-
terminants of the fiscal sustainability are assessed for seven CEEC
8, namely 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic. 
We use quarterly data collected from Eurostat. The sample covers the period 
1999:1-2006:1 for all countries. We use following economic variables: the pri-
mary budget balance, the gross public debt and the temporary government 
spending
9. All the previous variables are measured in terms of their ratio to 
                                                 
8We cannot include the case of Hungary in our sample of EU NMS due to the unavailability of the 
quarterly Eurostat data for the countries. 
9We use GVAR (i.e. the temporary government spending) instead of YVAR (the output gap) due 
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nominal GDP. Moreover, they are quarterly seasonally-adjusted by using the 
Tramo/Seats method
10 (Gómez and Maravall, 1996). 
Finally, we integrate political variables such as the election year and the 
ideology of political parties to respectively test for political business cycle and 
partisan effects. Appendix B describes the political evolution in each country; 
the political variables are extracted from Europe-Politique
11 and Perspective-
Université de Sherbrooke 
12. 
 
2.2 Empirical Results 
 
All the regressions use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors and we include an autoregressive term for the case of 
Lithuania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic in order to remove serial correlation 
of the residuals (Cochrane-Orcutt procedure). 
Besides, the regression includes the lagged primary budgetary surplus 
Sprim(-1) in order to take into account the inertial process typically associated 
with fiscal policy. 
Finally, we test the eventual influence of an electoral cycle by using the 
dummy variable ELEC (=1 for the election year). Then, we examine the effects 
of political ideology by introducing the dummy variable PART (=1 when left-
wing parties governs) in country where a change of government political orienta-
tion occurred during the last decade (this was the case in Lithuania and in Po-
land, see Appendix B). 
The findings are summed-up in the table 1, 2 and 3. 
 
Table 1. Fiscal sustainability and influence of political variables in Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania 
 Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania 
Constant                      -5,06**    -5,04*    -5,63*   
Sprim(-1)                       0,19*    0,75**    0,36*   
Debt (-1)                     0,31**    0,12*    0,09*   
GVARt                         -0,78**    -1,18**     -0,95**   
ELEC                         -0,07    -0,11    0,15 
PART     0,25 
AR(1)                              0,57**   
Adjusted R
2                         0,76    0,69    0,74   
DW                             1,79    1,82    1,78   
                                                 
10TRAMO, « Time Series Regression with ARIMA Noise, Missing Observations and Outliers », 
and SEATS ‘Signal Extraction in ARIMA Time Series ». 
11Available online at http://www.europe-politique.eu/vie-politique.html 
12Available online at http://worldperspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/ 
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Notes: (1) Dependent variable is the primary surplus, ratio to GDP. (2) Sprim(-1) is the 
lagged primary budget balance; Debt(-1) is the lagged public debt; GVARt  is the tempo-
rary government expenditure;  ELEC is the dummy political variable corresponding to 
the election year; PART is the dummy political variable corresponding to the left-wing 
parties at the head of government. (3) See appendix B for the government political orien-
tation in each country. (4) OLS estimations with robust standard error, (**) 1 % confi-
dence interval; (*) 5 % confidence interval; (°) 10 % confidence interval. (5)The estima-
tion and the calculation of the previous panel procedures were carried out in E-views 
version 5.1. 
 
As indicated in table 1, the coefficient on the lagged debt-income ratio, 
for the Baltic States, is positive (he has the expected sign) and statistically sig-
nificant indicating the absence of a mean-reverting process in the series. As a 
result, the positive response of the primary surplus to changes in debt shows that 
fiscal policy in the three Baltic States is satisfying the intertemporal budget con-
straint. However, estimations show no significant influence of the political vari-
ables tested in Baltic States. 
 
Table 2.  Fiscal sustainability and influence of political variables in Poland and 
Slovenia 
  Slovenia Poland 
Constant -2,35*  -2,65 
Sprim(-1)                         0,25*    0,42* 
Debt (-1)                      -0,03    0,06* 
GVARt -0,73*      -1,56** 
ELEC -0,28*      -0,14 
PART 0,62*       
Adjusted R
2                      0,84    0,75 
DW 1,82  1,86 
 Notes: See table 1.  
 
According to the sign of the coefficient of Debt(-1), it appears that pub-
lic debt is sustainable in Slovenia but not in Poland. Moreover, estimations in 
table 4 display partisan and electoral effects in Poland, so that such political 
factors are one of the determinants of the fiscal unsustainability in this country.   
 
Table 3.  Fiscal sustainability and Influence of political variables in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia 
  The Czech Republic  Slovakia 
Constant  -1,35    -3,02**   
Sprim(-1)                        0,46**    0,33*   
Debt (-1)                     -0.05    0,03*   
GVARt                                     -0.66**    -0,71**   
ELEC                         -0,25    0,14   Srdjan Redžepagić and Matthieu Llorca 
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AR(1)                           0,53*    0,65* 
Adjusted R
2       0,79    0,82   
DW                              1,75    1,85   
 Notes: See table 1. 
 
Finally, we find that public debt is sustainable in Slovakia but not in the 





If we comment our different results for each country, it appears first that by us-
ing fiscal reaction function, fiscal policy is sustainable in the Baltic States, Slo-
vakia and Slovenia, but not for Poland and the Czech Republic. It can be inter-
ested to compare such results obtained via the Bohn’s fiscal reaction function 
with the findings that we obtained by using the present-value approach in a panel 
perspective (Llorca and Redzepagic, 2007). The results in these two approaches 
seems coherent with on the one hand the existence of fiscal sustainability in a 
panel perspective in the present-value framework and on the other hand a fiscal 
policy sustainable in Baltic states, Slovenia and Slovakia.   
Second, we find budget electoral cycle and partisan effects in Poland but 
not in the rest of our countries. We can notice that such political influence of 
fiscal unsustainability appears in a big country such as Poland and not in small 
countries such as Baltic states or Slovenia. Moreover, the political influence in 
Poland seems to follow some European cases due to political structure in this 
country with a clear opposition between left and right wing parties since 1997 
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ference between actual GDP in constant prices, and 
estimated potential GDP. The latter is estimated 
using a production function approach taking into 
account the capital stock, changes in labour supply, 
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Appendix B:  Political orientation of governments (1999:1-2006:1) 
Country and   Date  Direction of movement       Explanation 
Estonia 
03/1999 
(to 01/2002)       











maaRahvaliit, Res Publica  
and ER 
Latvia 
10/1998                
 
10/2002     
(to 03/2004) 
 




Coalition between TB- 
LNNK and LC Coalition 




10/2000   
(to 07/2001)              
 
10/2004                
 





Coalition between LCS, 
LLS, MKDS, NS, LLRA
15  
Coalition between VNDPS, 








09/2001                 
 










Coalition between ZChN, 
PChD, RdR, PC, SKL, RS-
AWS, UW
17  
Coalition between PSL, 
SLD, UP
18      
PiS
19 
                                                 
13Respectively Erakond Mõõdukad (EM), Erakond Isamaaliit (EI) and Eesti Reformierakond (ER) 
14"Tēvzemei un Brīvībai" - Latvijas Nacionālās Neatkarības Kustība (TB-LNNK), Jaunais Laiks 
(JL), Latvijas Pirmā Partija (LPP), and Zaļo un Zemnieku Savienība (ZZS) 
15Lietuvos Centro Sajunga (LCS), Lietuvos Liberalu Sajunga (LLS), Moderniųjų Krikščionių 
Demokratų Sąjunga (MKDS), Naujoji Sąjunga - Socialliberalai (NS) and Lietuvos Lenkų Rinkimų 
Akcija (LLRA) 
16Valstiečių ir Naujosios Demokratijos Partijų Sąjunga (VNDPS), Naujoji Sąjunga - Sociallibera-
lai (NS), Darbo Partija (DP), and Lietuvos Sociāldemokrātu Partija (LSDP) 
17Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe (ZChN), Partia Chrześcijańskich Demokratów (PChD), 
Ruch dla Rzeczypospolitej (RdR), Porozumienia Centrum (PC), Stronnictwo Konserwatywno 
Ludowe (SKL), Ruch Społeczny Akcji Wyborczej Solidarność (RS-AWS), and l'Unia Wolnosci 
(UW, Union pour la liberté) 
18Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL), Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD), and Unia Pracy 
(UP) 
19 Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (PiS) Srdjan Redžepagić and Matthieu Llorca 
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Slovakia 

















SMK, SDKÚ, KDH, ANO 
(Aliancia Nového Občana) 
Slovenia 
10/2000                 
 
 







Coalition between SLS, 
DeSUS, LDS, ZLSD
21  
Coalition between DeSUS, 
LDS, ZLSD 
The Czech Republic 
06/1998       
 






Česká Strana Sociálně 
Demokratická (ČSSD) 




Source: Europe-Politique and Perspective-Université de Sherbrooke  





                                            
20Magyar Koalíció Pártja - Strana Madarskej Koalicie (MKP-SMK), Demokratická Strana (DS), 
Slovenská Demokratická a Krestanská Únia (SDKÚ), Krestansko Demokratické Hnutie (KDH), 
Strana Demokratickej Ľavice (SDĽ), and Strana Obcianskeho Porozumenia (SOP). 
21Slovenska Ljudska Stranka (SLS), Demokratična Stranka Upokojencev Slovenije (DeSUS), 
Liberalna Demokracija Slovenije (LDS), and Združena Lista Socialnih Demokratov (ZLSD) 
22Respectively Unie Svobody - Demokratická Unie (US-DEU) and Křesťanská a Demokratická 
Unie - Československou Strana Lidová (KDU-ČSL) 